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I. INTRODUCTION 
Enacted in 1975 as a modest work bonus and expanded substantially in 1993 as part of 
welfare reform policy (Hoffman and Seidman, 2003; Ozawa, 1995), the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) is the largest anti-poverty social welfare program targeting working families in the 
US (Nichols and Rothstein, 2016) providing nearly 29 million low-income tax filers with $68 
billion in earnings subsidies (Hoynes and Rothstein, 2016). The EITC is a refundable tax credit 
that comprises an important component of the social safety net for low- and moderate-income 
(LMI) households (Bitler, Hoynes, and Kuka, 2017; Danziger, et al., 2002; Hoffman and 
Seidman, 2003), helping these households cope with income and expense shocks (Tach et al., 
2019). The EITC is lauded for its low administrative costs and high take-up rate and more 
importantly for its effectiveness in raising after-tax earnings and lifting working families with 
children out of poverty (Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish, 2009; Gundersen and Ziliak, 2004; 
Hardy, Smeeding, and Ziliak, 2018; Hoynes and Patel, 2018), though sharp reductions in the 
credit when children age out reduces labor force participation (Moulton, Graddy-Reed, and 
Lanahan, 2016).  
The EITC conveys other, non-financial benefits. Recipients report psychological rewards, 
including relief from stress associated with unpaid bills and the threat of utility cut-offs, and a 
sense of social inclusion by receiving a non-stigmatized, work-related benefit (Sykes et al., 
2015). EITC receipt is also linked to healthy food purchases (McGranahan and Schanzenbach, 
2013), health insurance coverage (Baughman, 2005) and improved birth (Hill and Gurley-
Calvez, 2019; Hoynes, Miller, and Simon, 2015), maternal health (Evans and Garthwaite, 2014) 
and child development (Hamad and Rehkopf, 2016) outcomes.  
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Still, the EITC has policy limitations and weaknesses due to its design as a refundable tax 
credit. Recipients must wait until they file their federal income tax returns to receive lump sum 
refunds from the credit – effectively providing a zero-interest loan to the federal government 
(Jones, 2012). By contrast, other public assistance programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) offer monthly benefits to support immediate household 
consumption (Holt, 2015). The decision to structure the EITC as a one time, lump-sum payment 
may lead households to rely on credit or high-cost financial products to cover their expenses in 
the months prior to EITC receipt; eligible households spend 5 percent of the value of the EITC 
on credit card interest to smooth consumption (Jones and Michelmore, 2016).  
On the other hand, lump sum tax refunds represent an opportunity for EITC recipients to 
build emergency savings (Jones, 2012; Rhine et al., 2006; Smeeding, 2002) – short-term savings 
that can be used (i.e., dissaved) by households to cope with dips income or spikes in expenses. In 
the context of receiving tax refunds, saving all or part of one's refund can smooth consumption in 
the months following tax filing. Weber (2016) found that EITC rules discourage saving for 
recipients in the phase-out region, yet the study examined interest-bearing accounts as opposed 
to no or low-interest savings accounts recipients would likely use for emergency and short-term 
saving.  
Though EITC recipients use tax refunds for many other purposes–paying overdue bills, 
reducing debt, and making large purchases (Barrow and McGranahan, 2000; Mendenhall et al., 
2012; Sykes et al., 2015; Tach et al., 2018), LMI tax filers increase refund saving when they 
receive encouragement, incentives, and facilitation (Azurdia and Freeman, 2016; Beverly, 
Schneider, and Tufano. 2006; Beverly, Tescher, and Romich, 2004; Key et al., 2015; Tucker, 
Key, and Grinstein-Weiss, 2014). 
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Federal policy proposals may better promote refund saving among EITC recipients. The 
Refund to Rainy Day Savings Act (S.1018) would significantly expand tax-time savings by 
offering LMI households the opportunity to set aside 20 percent of their refund for six months to 
receive a 50 percent match on the deferred portion (Halpern-Meekin et al., 2018). A similar bill 
introduced in recent sessions of Congress, the Financial Security Credit Act, would provide a 50 
percent match of refund amounts deposited into one of several eligible savings products. A 
competing policy proposal is to offer periodic, advance payment of the EITC so that households 
would receive a portion of their expected credit to help smooth consumption during the tax year 
(Bellisle and Marzahl, 2015; Holt, 2015). 
The purpose of this study is to inform EITC policy development related to tax-time 
savings among LMI households in three ways. First, we draw on field experiments conducted in 
2015 and 2016 to assess the effectiveness of randomly assigned message-based and choice 
architecture interventions on refund savings allocations among a large sample of EITC recipients 
who filed their federal income tax returns online. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
assess online tax-time savings intervention outcomes exclusively among a large sample of EITC 
recipients using direct observations of savings behavior from administrative tax data. Second, we 
use a survey experiment to test the feasibility of refund saving policy proposals by assessing the 
probability that EITC recipients would defer a portion of their refund for six months if offered 0, 
25, or 50 percent refund savings matches. Third, we assess whether refund saving behaviors and 
preferences vary by refund amounts. Findings from our study can inform EITC policies 
concerning savings message and deferred refund saving interventions to help EITC recipients 
build emergency savings and cope with financial uncertainties.  
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We find that interventions delivered in 2015 and 2016 have statistically significant 
impacts on the refund saving take-up rate and on amounts of refunds saved among EITC 
recipients that are largely independent of refund size. Although the magnitude of these impacts is 
relatively modest, behavioral interventions delivered through an online tax filing platform that 
reaches hundreds of thousands of tax filers can encourage refund savings among EITC recipients 
to help cope with economic instability. We also find that modest savings incentives have the 
potential to dramatically increase refund saving take-up among EITC recipients, and that refund 
deferral preferences rise with the size of the refund. However, responses to hypothetical match 
responses are mostly insensitive to refund amounts.    
Our study arrives at an important time in tax policy, given the aforementioned policies to 
promote savings, as well as the recently passed Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), which 
increases the child tax credit from $1,000 to $2,000 per child, the first $1,400 of which is 
refundable. The TCJA did not alter the EITC or tax-time savings inducements for LMI filers, and 
our findings can inform policymakers on how to help EITC recipients build emergency savings 
amidst substantial economic constraints.  
II. TAX REFUNDS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD EMERGENCY SAVINGS 
Low- and moderate-income (LMI) households struggle with many forms of economic 
instability – income volatility, periods of unemployment, public assistance cycling, and large, 
unplanned expenses (Acs, Loprest, and Nichols, 2009; Despard et al., 2018a; Heflin, 2006; 
Moore, Wood, and Rangarajan, 2012; Morduch and Siwicki, 2017; Pew Charitable Trusts, 
2015a; Roll et al., 2017; Seefeldt, 2016). These sources of economic instability heighten risk for 
material hardship (Despard et al., 2018b; Leete and Bania, 2010; McKernan, Ratcliffe, and 
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Vinopal, 2009; Pilkauskas, Currie, and Garfinkel, 2012), such as food insecurity (Tarasuk, 
McIntyre, and Li, 2007) and eviction (Desmond and Kimbro, 2015).  
Having emergency savings–money set aside to use in the event of unexpected dips in 
income or large expenses–lessens risk for material hardship (Gjertson, 2016; Lusardi, 1998; 
McKernan et al., 2009), retirement account hardship withdrawals (Lusardi, 2011), and credit 
dependence (Jones and Michelmore, 2016). However, LMI households typically lack sufficient 
emergency savings. Most LMI households (85 percent) did not have enough in emergency 
savings to cover at least three months of living expenses at the federal poverty level (McKernan 
et al., 2009). Households in the bottom two income quintiles had liquid savings that could cover 
only 9 and 15 days of regular living expenses, respectively (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015b). 
Thus, many LMI households may be ill-equipped to respond to economic instability without 
experiencing hardship.  
Tax refunds are irregular windfalls (Epley and Gneezy, 2007), more likely to be used to 
increase savings than usual income (Mammen and Lawrence, 2006; Romich and Weisner, 2000). 
The opportunity to build emergency savings is especially ripe for households which receive the 
EITC, a refundable tax credit that offers a substantial financial benefit for qualifying households. 
For the 2015 tax year, the average credit was $3,186 for families with children, though the 
average credit is considerably lower for single filers ($293) (Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, 2016). 
Despite the opportunity to build emergency savings at tax filing, there are several barriers 
to promoting refund savings. First, LMI households often use tax refunds for other reasons 
besides saving–overdue bills, debt reduction, home improvements and repairs, car repairs, and 
large purchases (Halpern-Meekin et al., 2015; Mendenhall et al., 2012; Shaefer, Song, and 
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Shanks, 2013; Smeeding, Phillips, and O'Connor, 2000; Sykes et al., 2015; Tach and Greene, 
2014). Second, even if LMI tax filers do intend to save part or all their refund, a gap exists 
between intention to save refunds and actual refund saving behavior. Mendenhall et al. (2012) 
found that 57 percent of a sample of 194 EITC recipients followed over a six-month period 
intended to save their refunds, but only 39 percent could meet their savings goals. Similarly, 
Spader, Ratcliffe, and Stegman (2005) found that 55 percent of low-income tax filers in North 
Carolina who planned to save their refund did not save any portion of it.  
III. TAX-TIME SAVINGS INTERVENTIONS AND EVIDENCE 
Though there have been relatively few rigorous studies of interventions intended to 
promote tax refund savings, the evidence from these interventions demonstrates positive savings 
outcomes for LMI tax filers. The Extra Credit Savings program in Chicago gave LMI tax filers 
free tax preparation services, an opportunity to open a savings account with a 2.5 percent interest 
rate, direct deposit of refunds into these accounts, and a 10 percent bonus for amounts still saved 
after one year. The program was successful in increasing account ownership, but not in helping 
filers accumulate liquid assets (Beverly et al., 2004). The Refund to Assets program offered low-
income tax filers in Tulsa, Oklahoma an opportunity to open savings accounts and/or split their 
refunds into existing savings accounts. Beverly et al. (2006) found a take-up rate of 20 percent 
and that participants saved an average of $606, or almost half of their refunds. However, four 
months later, most saved refund amounts were spent.  
More recent interventions have incorporated incentives to encourage tax filers to retain 
saved refunds. Most (70 percent) SaveNYC participants responded to and received a 50 percent 
match for allocating and retaining a portion of their refund to savings (Tucker et al., 2014). 
Savers were less likely than non-savers to experience financial difficulty in the year following 
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tax filing (Key et al., 2015). Modeled after the New York City program, SaveUSA offered 50 
percent matches on amounts of refunds low-income tax filers allocated and retained in savings 
for one year. Results based on a 42-month follow-up indicate an 8-percentage point increase in 
the proportion of filers with any non-retirement savings and $522 more in savings among 
treatment compared to control group participants (Azurdia and Freedman, 2016). 
The studies reviewed above suggest that opportunities, encouragement, and incentives 
can increase the refund saving take-up rate and retained refund savings among LMI tax filers. 
However, these studies were conducted with small samples and were not conducted exclusively 
with EITC recipients, who are more likely than other low-income tax filers to be single parents 
with children who have greater financial challenges to navigate. In addition, savings incentives 
delivered in community-based settings may be too costly to implement at scale (Grinstein-Weiss 
et al., 2015). 
IV. CURRENT STUDY 
The (name of initiative) is an ongoing collaboration among (names of collaborating 
institutions and organizations), with the goal of encouraging LMI households to save refunds at 
tax time. (Initiative) collaborators test interventions informed by behavioral economics and 
delivered through (name of software) tax filing software to encourage filers to deposit a portion 
of their federal tax refunds into a savings vehicle. (Name of software) is a free version of (name 
of software) available to LMI tax filers. Randomized controlled trials testing these interventions 
have been conducted every year since 2012. 
A. Prior Evidence from (name of initiative) 
Prior evidence from (name of initiative) experiments conducted in 2012, 2013, and 2015 
indicated that LMI tax filers who received motivational messages (e.g., encouraging filers to 
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save for emergencies or for retirement) and choice architecture manipulations (i.e., making 
saving all of one's refund the first choice on the refund allocation screen) were more likely to 
allocate all or a portion of their refund to a savings account and had higher average refund saving 
amounts compared to filers in control groups who received the standard tax filing experience in 
(name of software). In comparing different types of behavioral interventions, higher anchors 
(i.e., suggestions to save a certain proportion or amount of one's refund) and choice architecture 
manipulations had a greater impact on savings outcomes than motivational messages (Grinstein-
Weiss et al., 2017a, 2017b; Roll et al., 2018). Several studies from (name of initiative) also 
investigated the impact of these interventions on downstream household outcomes, finding that 
tax filers who randomly received the savings interventions held more of their refund in savings 
than the control group six months after tax filing (Roll et al., 2018, 2019), and that refund 
savings deposits were associated with lower reported rates of material hardship six months post-
filing (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016). 
B. Testing Interventions Among EITC Recipients 
We build on evidence from our prior studies by examining savings outcomes among 
EITC recipients and comparing these outcomes with non-EITC recipients for the 2015 and 2016 
experiments. In our prior studies, we found that EITC recipients differ from other LMI tax filers 
with respect to filing status, age, number of dependents, adjusted gross income, and federal tax 
refund amounts. Given these differences in socioeconomic characteristics, it is important to 
determine whether EITC recipients' responses to interventions aimed at encouraging tax refund 
saving are different than among other LMI tax filers. 
In addition, we use a survey experiment to examine EITC recipients' hypothetical 
probabilities of deferring refunds based on varying incentive levels, thus allowing us to directly 
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inform recent deferred refund saving policy proposals. Our study is unique in that we use direct 
observations of savings behavior among a large sample of EITC recipients and we examine the 
intersection of an existing refundable tax credit aimed at supplementing wages with an 
inducement to build emergency savings. 
C. Intervention Overview 
In each study year, participants were randomly assigned to one of three interventions or a 
control group which received no intervention. Figure 1 summarizes the interventions. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
1. 2015 Interventions 
In the 2015 experiments, three unique message-based interventions were delivered after 
participants had entered all their information into (name of software) and determined that they 
would be receiving a refund. A common heading was used for these three interventions: "Choose 
how you'd like your federal refund".  
First, in the “emergency savings” condition, the message read "No one knows what life 
has in store. In fact, 2 out of 3 people will have an unexpected financial emergency in 6 months 
or less. It pays to save!" This message was followed by a sidebar next to the savings deposit 
allocation choice that read "Be prepared. Don't let life catch you by surprise. Save something 
today and have cash on hand when it's needed down the road". 
Second, in the "interactive goal" condition, the message read "Saving some or all of your 
refund is an excellent way to set aside money to achieve your goals", followed by a sidebar that 
read "Imagine a brighter future today. Then select which goals you'd like to save for most" 
Participants then were presented with icons for car/vehicle, house, education, retirement, 
emergencies, and other.  
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Third, in the "interactive retirement" condition, the message read "Your refund can go a 
long way towards saving money for retirement" followed by a sidebar that read "Imagine 
yourself at retirement. Then select what you’d like to be doing and start saving for it today!" 
Participants were then presented with icons for family time, traveling, volunteering, RVing, 
fishing, and relaxing. Nothing occurred when participants clicked on any icons on the interactive 
goal and interactive retirement screens.  
In all three interventions, participants also received a choice architecture manipulation 
embedded in refund allocation options. The first option presented was to deposit the entire 
refund into a savings account, followed by options to split the refund among multiple bank 
accounts or toward a savings bond, deposit the entire refund into a checking account, or receive a 
paper check in the mail.  
2. 2016 Interventions 
In 2016, three interventions were delivered – also after participants learned they would 
receive a federal tax refund under a common heading "Choose how you'd like your refund". 
First, a choice architecture-only intervention used the same manipulation as in 2015, wherein the 
first option was to save their entire refund, followed by options to split the refund, deposit into a 
checking account, or receive a paper check. However, no persuasive messaging around saving 
was included.  
In the second treatment condition, an emergency savings message was added to the 
choice architecture of the first treatment condition. This message read "Don't let life catch you by 
surprise. Save something today and have the cash on hand when you need it down the road", 
followed by a sidebar that read "Save for life's unexpected emergencies and be ready for: getting 
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a car fixed, making up for lost income, paying medical bills, covering legal expenses, repairing 
your home." This message had no interactive component. 
In the third treatment condition the emergency savings messaging incorporated an 
interactive element. Participants were first shown a screen that read "Saving doesn't have to be 
that hard…your refund could be just the secret weapon you need to be ready for whatever life 
has in store". This was followed by an invitation to "Select one or more expenses below that 
might affect you and we'll help you get ahead by using your refund to save" with icons for car 
repairs, job loss, medical bills, legal fees, home repairs, and other. After participants made their 
selection(s), they continued to another screen with the choice architecture manipulation with a 
sidebar that read "Don't let these expenses put your life on hold", displaying their selections from 
the previous screen.     
In both 2015 and 2016, participants in the control group were asked whether they wished 
to receive their refund by direct deposit into a bank account, paper check, or split into multiple 
accounts or toward a savings bond, which is the standard (name of software) experience. No 
message-based or choice architecture interventions were delivered. To allocate all or part of 
refunds to a savings account, participants needed to have an existing savings account.  
D. Role of Economic Theory and Behavioral Science in Intervention Design 
Content of the emergency and retirement savings messages was informed by economic 
theory that emphasizes the role of liquid assets in mitigating hardship (Deaton, 1991) and the 
impact of adverse events such as job loss (Lusardi, 1998). Savings messages were also informed 
by prior evidence indicating that individuals over-value immediate consumption compared to 
saving (Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter, 2010; Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue, 2002; 
Thaler, 1981) and underestimate future adversity (Bryan and Hershfield, 2012). Also, individuals 
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devote limited attention to making financial and other decisions (Johnson et al., 2012), will use 
reference points to make decisions when they are available (Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson, 
2010), and can be influenced by persuasive messaging aimed at behavior change (Banks et al., 
1995; Fishbein et al. 2002).  
The choice architecture manipulations in 2015 and 2016 were informed by prior research 
indicating individuals' tendency to accept default options (Choi et al., 2003; Thaler, Sunstein, 
and Balz, 2014). Altering choice architecture by limiting the options to ones that are financially 
beneficial was found effective in facilitating Medicare Part D plan decisions (Congdon et al., 
2011), while making retirement saving the default option boosted take-up rates in retirement 
plans (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; Beshears et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2003). 
E. Study Purpose 
The purpose of the current study was to assess savings outcomes among a sub-sample of 
2015 and 2016 (name of initiative) participants who received the EITC and to compare these 
outcomes to other LMI tax filers who did not receive the EITC. Prior studies have not examined 
savings outcomes solely among EITC recipients, many of whom are single parents with children 
who face elevated risk for economic instability and insecurity, nor have savings outcomes among 
EITC recipients been compared to non-recipients with similar incomes. We also conducted a 
survey experiment to assess the probability that EITC recipients would defer a portion of their 
refund to receive a savings match. Findings from our study can inform current policy proposals 
aimed at promoting economic security among EITC recipients (Bellisle and Marzahl, 2015; Edin 
et al., 2014; Holt, 2015).  
V. METHODS 
A. Sample and Experimental Design 
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Samples for the current study were comprised of 2015 (n = 270,891) and 2016 (n = 
112,562) (name of initiative) participants who received the EITC. In addition, a sample of 3,979 
EITC recipients who completed a household financial survey in 2016 was drawn to assess refund 
deferral preferences based on randomly assigned hypothetical savings match conditions. Study 
samples are drawn from the larger 2015 (n = 646,116) and 2016 (n = 284,125) (name of 
initiative) participant samples of LMI tax filers who filed their federal income taxes using (name 
of software), expected to receive a refund, and were randomly assigned to an intervention group 
described above or to a control group (see Figure 1). Assignment took place within the (name of 
software), after participants completed their federal income tax returns and learned they would 
receive a refund. (Name of software) users who were not due a refund were not part of the study.  
1. Survey Experiment Regarding Deferral Preferences 
To assess EITC recipients' refund deferral and savings match preferences, we randomly 
assigned survey respondents to see one of three different hypothetical questions in the 2016 
household financial survey. Each of these questions asked about their willingness to save (defer) 
20 percent of their refund for six months, but the three groups of respondents were randomized 
to see this question with either no deferred refund saving match, or a 25 or 50 percent match. In 
the no match condition, participants were asked: "Many people get a financial boost from tax 
refunds but find themselves short on funds later in the year. Imagine a program that allows you 
to put off a portion of your refund and receive it 6 months later. You just completed your taxes 
and expect a $(amount) refund. If you had the following options today, which would you choose 
to do?"1 The amount was populated with their self-reported federal tax refund amount. Response 
 
1 While this question populates a refund amount based on the respondents’ self-reported federal tax refund amount, 
we take the refund measure used in this analysis from administrative tax data. The use of administrative data for 
refund amount allows us to avoid issues of nonresponse to the survey question on refund amount and is a more 
accurate measure of what respondents actually received as a refund. In practice, this distinction makes very little 
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choices included to receive their full refund at tax time or to receive 80 percent of their expected 
refund at tax time and the remaining 20 percent six months later.  
In the 25 and 50 percent match conditions, participants were asked: "Many people get a 
financial boost from tax refunds but find themselves short on funds later in the year. Imagine a 
program that offers one bonus dollar for every two/four dollars of your refund if you wait 6 
months to receive it. Your total tax refund would be larger, but you would have to wait 6 months 
to receive some of it. You just completed your taxes and expect a $(amount) refund. If you had 
the following options today, which would you choose to do?" Response choices included to 
receive their full refund at tax time or to receive 80 percent of their expected refund at tax time 
and the remaining 20 percent six months later plus either a 25 or 50 percent match.   
Because participants were re-sampled based on EITC recipient status for the savings 
interventions and survey experiments, we conducted group balance checks using normalized 
difference scores using the following formula: 
 
where the numerator is the absolute difference in treatment and control group means and the 
denominator is the square root of the sum of treatment and control group sample variances. 
Scores greater than .25 are considered to indicate sample imbalance (Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009). We assessed imbalance for age, gross income, filing status, number of dependents, filing 
date, refund amount, income from wages, unemployment benefits, retirement benefits, interest, 
and dividends. Normalized treatment-control group differences for the 2015 and 2016 
 
difference to our analysis. Models incorporating self-reported refund amount are almost identical to models that use 
administrative tax data, and the correlation between the self-reported refund amount and the administrative refund 
amount is 0.95. 
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intervention and survey experiment samples were no higher than 0.031, far below the standard of 
.25 (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), indicating that randomization was kept intact after re-
sampling on EITC receipt status.  
B. Data and Analysis 
 Study data concerning savings outcomes are from administrative tax data collected on 
federal income tax returns completed in 2015 and 2016 for tax years 2014 and 2015, 
respectively. These data were available in aggregate form, with sub-group aggregation by EITC 
status and treatment and control group assignment. Data regarding participants' preferences for 
deferring a portion of their refunds were derived from a household financial survey that was 
completed by 3,979 EITC recipients in 2016 who agreed to complete the survey after they filed 
their taxes. 
We used two dependent variables to estimate average treatment effects for refund savings 
outcomes: (1) the refund saving take-up rate, measured by the proportion of participants who 
allocated all or a part of their refund to a savings account; and (2), the amount of refund allocated 
to a savings account. Whereas y denotes each savings outcome and w group assignment (1 = 
treatment; 0 = control), average treatment effects (ATE) for interventions are estimated: 
E (y | w = 1) - E (y | w = 0) = E (y1) - E (y0) = ATE 
To assess outcomes, we estimated the ATE using chi square tests of independence (χ2) 
and independent samples t-tests for refund saving take-up and refund savings amounts, 
respectively, comparing intervention and control group participants. In addition, to detect effect 
size heterogeneity, we examined both savings outcomes across five refund quantiles for the 2015 
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sample.2 That is, treatment-control group differences were examined to determine whether 
treatment effects varied based on the size of the refund. 
For refund saving take-up rates, we calculated effect size using a binomial effect size 
display, the resulting percentage of which was transformed into Cohen's d (Lenhard and 
Lenhard, 2016; Rosenthal and Rubin, 1982). For refund savings amount, we calculated Cohen's d 
using standardized mean differences between the intervention and control group.  
To analyze responses to the survey experiment concerning hypothetical refund saving 
matches, we used linear probability modeling to examine deferral preferences as binary 
outcomes (Hellevik, 2009), assigning a value of '1' to defer 20 percent of the expected refund, 
and '0' to receive the entire refund at tax time. We estimate three models in this analysis: An 
unadjusted model examining the relationship between match rate and deferral preferences; a 
model in which we control for refund quantile, age, income, filing status, number of dependents, 
race/ethnicity, gender, home, credit card, and bank account ownership, taxes withheld, budgeting 
habits, ability to come up with $2,000 in an emergency, material hardship and financial shocks in 
the prior six months, and health insurance status; and a model that explores the interaction 
between refund quantile and match rate, controlling for the above demographic and financial 
characteristics.   
VI. RESULTS 
A. Sample Characteristics 
Characteristics of the 2015 and 2016 study samples are presented in Table 1, including 
comparisons of EITC recipients and non-recipients. Differences in characteristics between the 
2015 and 2016 samples and between the treatment and control groups in each year were 
 
2 Data limitations prevent us from conducting this same analysis for the 2016 sample. 
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negligible. Annual income was low – averaging around $16,000, slightly higher than the 
estimated median adjusted gross income ($14,6863) of all EITC filers in the U.S. (Brookings 
Institution, 2018).  
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
Average refunds were substantial, representing almost a quarter of income. About half of 
the samples in each year claimed head of household tax filing status – the same as for all U.S. 
EITC filers (Brookings Institution, 2018), which typically denotes a household headed by a 
single adult parent with one or more children or other dependents. Compared to U.S. EITC filers 
(Brookings Institution, 2018), the samples were comprised of a larger proportion of single filers 
(33 to 34 percent vs. 26 percent) and a smaller proportion of married filing jointly filers (14 to 16 
percent vs. 24 percent).  
In both 2015 and 2016, tax filers in the studies differed significantly based on EITC 
status. Compared to non-recipients, EITC recipients were older, less likely to have single filing 
status, and more likely to have head of household or married filing jointly filing status. 
Recipients also had more dependents, higher incomes, and higher tax refunds.     
Saving Outcomes 
In this section, we present results of randomly assigned interventions in 2015 and 2016 to 
encourage EITC recipients to save their tax refunds. Savings rates among participants who 
received an intervention were higher than the control group in both years by about 3 to 4 
percentage points (p < .001). Savings rates among the three intervention groups in both years 
were similar, with effect sizes ranging from .10 to .14 in 2015, and .09 to .11 in 2016. Similarly, 
average amounts saved among participants who received an intervention were higher than the 
 
3 Authors' calculation of the weighted average median adjusted gross income for all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. 
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control group by close to or more than $100 in both years (p < .001), with effect sizes ranging 
from .08 to .10 in 2015, and .06 to .08 in 2016 (see Tables 2 and 3).  
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 here> 
Savings Outcomes by Refund Amounts: 2015 Sample 
To examine whether savings outcomes vary based on the size of one's tax refund, we 
present treatment-control group differences in refund savings take-up rates by refund quantiles in 
Table 4. Statistically significant average treatment effects were found for all quantiles, and the 
rate of refund savings increases with the quantile of the refund. However, the intervention 
appears to be somewhat less effective at motivating savings deposits for those with larger 
refunds, as indicated by slightly smaller effect sizes for those in the third quantile and above. 
Take-up rates increased modestly for both groups as refund amounts increased.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
EITC and non-EITC Recipient Savings Rates  
We also compare whether refund savings rates differ based on whether tax filers received 
the EITC. In 2015, the refund savings rate among non-EITC recipients was 9.87, 14.79, 14.91, 
and 14.16 percent among the control, emergency saving, interactive goal, and interactive 
retirement groups, respectively. Each of these savings rates was significantly higher than the rate 
among EITC recipients (p < .001). Overall, the refund savings rate was 10.52 and 12.53 percent 
among EITC and non-EITC recipients, respectively. 
In 2016, the refund savings rate among non-EITC recipients was 8.87, 14.35, 13.64, and 
13.31 percent among the control, emergency saving, interactive goal, and interactive retirement 
groups, respectively. Each of these savings rates was significantly higher than the rate among 
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EITC recipients (p < .001). Overall, the refund savings rate was 12.35 and 15.52 percent among 
EITC and non-EITC recipients, respectively. 
Survey Experiment: Refund Deferral Preferences and Savings Match Rates 
In this section, we present the results of a survey-based experiment assessing the 
relationship between potential EITC match rates and participants’ willingness to defer 20 percent 
of their refund for six months. Table 5 presents the unadjusted results of this experiment. 
Overall, 21 percent of 2016 EITC recipients in the survey said they would defer 20 percent of 
their refund for six months without the offer of a match. With a 25 and 50 percent match, these 
hypothetical deferral take-up rates rose to 70 and 80 percent, respectively. Hypothetical deferral 
take-up rates increased across all three match conditions with refund size. The percentage point 
difference between the 25 percent and no match conditions increased with refund size, yet 
decreased for the difference between the 25 and 50 percent match conditions.  
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Table 6 presents regression estimates of the relationship between match rates and refund 
deferral preferences among EITC recipients. Model 1 estimates this relationship without the use 
of any controls, Model 2 includes controls for the quantile of the refund amount as well as an 
array of other demographic and financial controls, and Model 3 incorporates an interaction 
between the refund quantile and the match rate. In Model 1, the unadjusted relationship between 
match rate and refund deferral preferences is identical to that seen in Table 5—the inclusion of a 
25 or 50 percent match increases the reported probability of deferral by 48 and 59 percentage 
points, respectively (p < .001).4 Model 2 demonstrates that the inclusion of controls does not 
affect these estimates, and that respondents with higher refunds have significantly higher 
 
4 F-tests show that the reported deferral response to the 50 percent match rate is significantly higher than the 25 
percent match rate in all models (p < .001). 
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reported deferral rates. Compared to participants in the first quantile for refund amount, 
participants in the third, fourth, and fifth quantiles had 8, 16, and 18 percent greater probabilities 
of deferring their refund (p < .001).  
The incorporation of interaction terms between refund quantile and the deferral match 
rate in Model 3 assesses the degree to which refund size moderates respondents’ response to 
match rates, controlling for other factors. Except for the coefficient on the interaction between a 
25 percent match and the fifth refund quantile (p < .05), the interaction between match rate and 
refund size is not statistically significant, indicating that the response to different refund match 
rates is not sensitive to the size of the refund. 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Figure 2 incorporates the Model 3 estimates to illustrate the predicted probability of 
refund deferral as a function of deferral match rate and refund quantile. The patterns in predicted 
probabilities reinforce the patterns observed in the regressions: Reported deferral rates increase 
as both match rate and refund size increase. This figure also indicates that, directionally 
speaking, a 50 percent match rate may be more effective at incentivizing deferral among those 
with lower refunds and that those with higher refunds are less responsive to the shift from a 25 
percent match to a 50 percent match.  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
DISCUSSION 
 In this paper, we investigate impacts on tax refund saving of behavioral interventions 
delivered through an electronic tax preparation platform among two samples of EITC recipients 
representing nearly 400,000 households. We discover statistically significant main treatment 
effects on refund saving take-up and amounts across all interventions delivered in both sample 
years. Participants who received a behavioral intervention saved $7.3 million and $8.1 million 
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more than participants in the control group in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Effect sizes ranged 
from .06 to .14 and are based on direct observations of savings behavior impacted by a low-touch 
and low-cost intervention with the potential for scale to reach hundreds of thousands of other 
EITC recipients. While the effect sizes are modest, they are observed in the context of a 
relatively inexpensive and large-scale intervention. Though a cost estimate for including savings 
messages and a modified choice architecture in online tax filing software is not available, the fact 
that these interventions do not substantially alter the online tax filing experience indicates that 
the marginal cost of implementing these changes is minimal. This suggests that low-touch 
message-based and choice architecture interventions could be a cost effective strategy for 
promoting tax-time savings.   
In comparing interventions, some instructive differences in impact emerge. In 2015, the 
emergency saving intervention performs slightly better than the interactive goal and interactive 
retirement interventions. This finding suggests that EITC recipients may be more responsive to 
messages encouraging preparation for near term, unexpected events versus longer range financial 
goals. Corroborating this finding, the emergency saving messages (both interactive and non-
interactive) delivered in 2016 performed better than the choice architecture-only intervention. 
However, these differences were modest.  
Overall, (name of initiative) interventions resulted in three to four percentage point 
increases in refund savings take-up and modest refund savings increases of around $100 among 
EITC recipients. From the 2015 sample, we see that these results are stable across refund 
quantiles, suggesting that EITC recipients can be encouraged to save regardless of the size of 
their expected tax refund. The impact on savings we find suggests some preference for liquidity 
and prior research indicates that making savings deposits (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016) and 
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having savings Brobeck, 2008; Gjertson, 2016; Tach et al., 2018) – even if held for short periods 
– reduces risk for material hardship. While saved refunds may provide EITC recipients with 
resources to help cope with economic instability, they may also view EITC refunds as 
precautionary savings built up throughout the year to address deferred repairs, purchases, 
expenses, and bills (Jones, 2012). 
Despite the impacts we observe, the overall refund saving take-up rate is low and even 
lower among EITC recipients compared to other LMI filers, likely a result of EITC recipients' 
competing priorities for allocating tax refunds (see, for example, Halpern-Meekin et al., 2015). 
Indeed, some households may wish to pay down unsecured debt first (Shaefer et al., 2013), 
having used credit cards to smooth consumption throughout the year (Jones and Michelmore, 
2016). Compared to non-recipients, EITC recipients in our study are more heavily comprised of 
unmarried parents with dependent children who may face greater barriers to saving tax refunds.  
Also, the average treatment effect of around $100 in increased refund savings we found is 
less than a month's rent for most LMI households. Though this amount could provide food 
during a spell of joblessness or help pay for a minor car repair, our finding suggests the need for 
additional incentives to make refund saving economically meaningful.  
To examine the role of incentives, we assess probabilities that EITC recipients would 
defer (and hence, save) their refund if offered a savings match. We find a very strong proclivity 
to save refunds if offered a 25 or 50 percent match. The proportion of EITC recipients who say 
they would defer 20 percent of their refund for six months jumps 49 percentage points from the 
offer of no match to an offer of a 25 percent match. The jump from the 25 to 50 percent match 
conditions is a relatively modest 10 percentage points.  
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Our findings concerning refund deferral preferences lend support to policy proposals 
aimed at encouraging EITC recipients and other LMI tax filers to save their refunds. Both the 
Refund to Rainy Day Savings Act (S.1018) and the Financial Security Credit Act include a 50 
percent match on refunds saved or deferred for six months (Halpern-Meekin et al., 2018). We 
find a high level of interest in both a 25 and 50 percent match among EITC recipients.  
Though refund deferral preferences in response to hypothetical savings matches rise with 
refund amount up to the fourth quantile, our tests for moderation indicate that these preferences 
are largely insensitive to refund size. This suggests that, despite the phase-in/out structure of the 
EITC relative to earnings, responses to savings incentives may be fairly stable by refund size. 
While the expressed intentions to save refunds based on the hypothetical incentives we 
test in our study are encouraging, participants may have been inclined to self-report affirmatively 
because they were primed with respect to saving as a normative behavior (Nolan et al., 2008). 
Moreover, prior research has found a gap between intended and actual refund saving among LMI 
households (Mendenhall et al., 2012; Spader et al., 2005). Many LMI tax filers who may wish or 
intend to save 20% of their refunds may find it difficult to follow through when confronted with 
competing needs at tax time.  
Our study offers important insights into interventions and policies aimed at improving the 
economic security of EITC recipient households. Prior research demonstrates that behavioral 
interventions can induce positive behavior changes such as retirement savings (Thaler and 
Benartzi, 2004), college enrollment (Castleman and Page, 2015) and financial aid applications 
renewals (Castleman and Page, 2016). We extend evidence concerning the promise of behavioral 
interventions via social welfare programs (Congdon and Shankar, 2015; Richburg-Hayes et al., 
2014) by demonstrating positive impacts among EITC recipients concerning refund saving.  
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Nonetheless, there are important limitations of our study to note with respect to refund 
saving policy proposals. The data available for our study allowed us to examine treatment effect 
heterogeneity by refund size for the 2015, but not 2016 sample. Also, our findings do not 
generalize to the EITC recipient population. (Name of initiative) participants are slightly 
younger, less likely to be African American or Latino, have slightly fewer children, and have 
greater educational attainment (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015), compared to EITC recipients in 
other studies (Azurdia and Freeman, 2016; Jones and Mahajan, 2015; Meyer, 2008; Nichols and 
Rothstein, 2016). Moreover, EITC recipients file their taxes in other ways. EITC recipients who 
file their taxes online may differ based on unobserved characteristics from EITC recipients who 
complete paper returns, or use paid or volunteer preparers.  
In addition, (name of tax filing software) requires filers to already have a savings account 
to save all or a portion of their expected tax refund. Under the Financial Security Credit Act, in 
addition to incentives, tax filers would have the opportunity to open a savings account when they 
file their federal income tax returns. This is an important policy feature, as the results we observe 
in our study might have been different if tax filers without savings accounts had the opportunity 
to open an account as they made their refund allocation decisions.  
An additional study limitation is that we do not observe whether participants' refund 
savings might have been offset by reductions in other savings accounts or increased borrowing, 
nor do we observe whether participants retained their refunds in savings or dissaved in the 
months following tax filing. However, we find in prior studies that tax filers who were randomly 
assigned to receive an intervention had retained a greater proportion of their refund in savings six 
months after tax filing compared to the control group (Roll et al., 2018, 2019). While these 
findings do not dismiss the possibility of asset shifting or debt accumulation offsets, we also find 
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that tax-time savings deposits are associated with lower likelihood of experiencing material 
hardship six months after filing taxes (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016). Thus, our prior studies 
suggest that the refund saving outcomes we observe among EITC recipients in this study may 
have a positive impact on household finances in the months following tax season. 
Making savings deposits are not the only ways that households set aside money for future 
use. For example, individuals construct mental accounts to consider certain portions of their 
liquid assets as saved for different purposes (Thaler, 1990). Still, once made, savings deposits 
tend to remain (Sikkel and van Meer, 2015). This makes it more likely EITC recipient 
households who save their refunds will have resources to draw upon when they experience a 
setback such as an expensive car repair or lost wages due to a family illness. 
 Still, saving refunds may not be possible among acutely constrained households, and may 
even be ill-advised among households carrying heavy unsecured debt to finance consumption 
(Seefeldt, 2015). Thus, an alternative proposal to deferred savings matches is periodic payment, 
where EITC-eligible tax filers would receive a half of their expected refundable credit in 
quarterly payments during the year (Holt, 2015). Periodic payment – as well as extending the 
EITC to non-custodial parents (Wheaton and Sorenson, 2010)‒has the advantage of boosting 
household income to smooth consumption during the year, which may help reduce demand for 
unsecured debt. However, prior research suggests that EITC recipients prefer receiving lump 
sum refunds at tax time as a form of forced saving (Jones, 2010; Jones, 2012; Romich and 
Weisner, 2000; Tach and Halpern-Meekin, 2014). Furthermore, take-up for the periodic EITC 
was very low, which led to its repeal in 2010, though Holt (2015) argues that periodic payment 
can be structured differently to lower the administrative burden on employers, one of the main 
factors behind the low take-up of this program. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In this study, we assess savings outcomes for a set of behavioral interventions delivered 
through an electronic tax filing platform with EITC recipients using a randomized control trial 
design. Interventions in the 2015 and 2016 experiments positively impacted both savings rates 
and amounts, though savings rates were lower among EITC recipients compared to other LMI 
tax filers. EITC recipients also showed strong interest in deferring a portion of their refunds if 
offered savings matches. Our findings lend support for policy proposals aimed at offering 
encouragement, facilitation, and incentives for EITC recipients to save part of their refunds, 
which may help EITC households cope with economic instability and reduce risk for material 
hardship. At the same time, the relatively modest levels of savings observed suggest that EITC 
recipient households are balancing an array of consumption priorities amid low earnings, and 
therefore generally have limited capacity to enact large changes to savings behavior. Ultimately, 
the EITC can serve as an important buffer for families that can set aside part or all their refund as 
savings, and financial incentives could be required to encourage LMI households to forgo current 
consumption in favor of savings. To the degree that current-period needs are being met within 
households, such improved savings behavior could improve overall well-being.  
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Figure 1 
2015 and 2016 Interventions 
Intervention 
Condition 
 
2015 Experiment 
 
2016 Experiment 
1 Control Control 
2 Emergency saving + Choice 
architecture 
Choice architecture 
3 Interactive goal + Choice 
architecture 
Emergency saving + Choice 
architecture 
4 Interactive retirement + Choice 
architecture 
Interactive emergency + Choice 
architecture 
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Table 1 
 
Sample Description: 2015 and 2016 Experiments 
 
Panel A. 2015 
Experiment  EITC Status 
 
Covariates 
Treatment 
% or mean (SD) 
Control 
% or mean (SD) 
Recipient 
% or mean (SD) 
Non-Recipient 
% or mean (SD) 
 
p 
Age 39.28 (11.91) 39.19 (11.87) 39.25 (11.90) 32.34 (16.99) *** 
Filing Status1       
Single 33.68 33.60 33.66 90.80 *** 
Head of Household 50.63 50.77 50.66 2.77 *** 
Married, filing jointly  15.62 15.57 15.61 4.84 *** 
Widow(er)  <1 <1 <1 <1 *** 
Number of dependents 1.18 (1.08) 1.18 (1.08) 1.18 (1.09) 0.07 (0.40) *** 
Gross annual income 16,589 (10,402) 16,597 (10,409) 16,591 (10,404) 13,946 (9,438) *** 
Federal tax refund 3,751 (2,725) 3,756 (2,710) 3,752 (2,722) 787 (842) *** 
N 202,866 68,025 270,891 357,065  
Panel B. 2016 
Experiment   EITC Status 
 
Covariates 
Treatment 
% or mean (SD) 
Control 
% or mean (SD) 
Recipient 
% or mean (SD) 
Non-Recipient 
% or mean (SD) 
 
Age 39.91 (12.19) 39.83 (12.18) 39.89 (12.19) 32.18 (17.66) *** 
Filing Status1       
Single 33.35 33.22 33.32 91.76 *** 
Head of Household 52.04 52.30 52.11 2.52 *** 
Married, filing jointly  14.53 14.38 14.49 4.37 *** 
Widow(er)  <1 <1 <1 <1 *** 
Number of dependents 1.16 (1.07) 1.17 (1.08) 1.16 (1.07) 0.06 (0.37) *** 
Gross annual income 16,660 (10,332) 16,691 (10,325) 16,668 (10,330) 13,222 (9,452) *** 
Federal tax refund 3,805 (2,758) 3,822 (2,747) 3,810 (2,756) 738 (790) *** 
N 88,484 28,078 112,562 171,563  
Note: 1 There were no cases of married filing separately as this filing status is a disqualification for the EITC. 
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Table 2 
 
Average Treatment Effects: 2015 Interventions 
 
  Savings rate Savings amount1 
Intervention n % χ2 p d  M SD p d 
Control 68,025 7.84    292.50 1259.49   
Emergency saving + CA 67,655 11.94 639.96 *** .14 429.01 1497.56 *** .10 
Interactive goal + CA  67,761 11.15 431.98 *** .12 406.65 1467.31 *** .08 
Interactive retirement + CA 67,450 11.14 429.24 *** .10 405.69 1461.88 *** .08 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001. 1 Includes allocations to savings deposits, excludes US Series I Savings Bond 
purchases. d = Cohen's d effect size estimation. CA = choice architecture. 
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Table 3 
 
Average Treatment Effects: 2016 Interventions 
 
  Savings Rate Savings Amount1 
Intervention n % χ2 p d  M SD p d 
Control 28,078 7.98    303.49 1293.03   
Choice architecture 28,085 10.75 127.75 *** .10 386.49 1432.76 *** .06 
Emergency saving + CA  28,221 11.12 160.83 *** .11 402.83 1464.03 *** .07 
Interactive emergency + 
CA 
28,178 10.95 145.50 *** .09 409.25 1489.82 *** .08 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001. 1 Includes allocations to savings deposits, excludes US Series I Savings 
Bond purchases. d = Cohen's d effect size estimation. CA = choice architecture. 
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Table 4 
 
Refund Saving Take-up, by Refund Quantile: 2015 Interventions 
 
  Treatment Control    
Refund Quantile n % %  χ2 p d 
1st ($1 - $329) 54,205 10.03 6.07 193.84 *** 0.07 
2nd ($330 - $1,300) 54,168 10.78 6.95 168.33 *** 0.07 
3rd ($1,301 - $2,990) 54,164 11.89 8.37 129.32 *** 0.06 
4th ($2,991 - $3,865) 54,182 11.99 8.92 96.55 *** 0.05 
5th ($3,866 and over) 54,172 12.76 9.35 113.17 *** 0.06 
Note: *** p < .001. d = Cohen's d effect size estimation. 
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Table 5  
 
Refund Deferral Preferences, by Refund Quintiles: 2016 Survey Experiment 
 
  % Choosing to defer 20% of refund for six mos. 
Refund Quantile n No match 25% match 50% match 
1st ($1 - $561) 672 13.1 54.3*** 73.3††† 
2nd ($562 - $1,133) 835 15.0 64.7*** 75.1†† 
3rd ($1,134 - $2,982) 808 18.6 68.5*** 79.6†† 
4th ($2,982 - $5,372) 793 29.9 76.1*** 84.1† 
5th (Over $5,372) 871 28.0 80.3*** 86.0 
Total 3,979 21.3 69.6*** 79.8††† 
Note: *** p < .001; compared to no match. †p < .05; ††p < .01; †††p <.001; compared to 25% match. 
 
  
 
 
48 
 
Table 6 
Refund Deferral Preferences: Marginal Effects 
Outcome Would Defer 20% of Refund 
Model 1 2 3 
Refund Deferral Match (Ref. = No Match)    
  25% Match 0.483*** 0.482*** 0.418*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.040) 
  50% Match 0.585*** 0.587*** 0.606*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.038) 
Refund Quantile (Ref. = 1st Quantile)    
  2nd ($562 - $1,133)  0.040 0.019 
  (0.022) (0.037) 
  3rd ($1,134 - $2,981)  0.078*** 0.053 
  (0.023) (0.038) 
  4th ($2,982 - $5,372)  0.163*** 0.171*** 
  (0.028) (0.041) 
  5th (Over $5,372)  0.177*** 0.158*** 
  (0.032) (0.043) 
Refund Deferral Match*Refund Quantile   
 
  25% Match*2nd Quantile   0.073 
   (0.053) 
  25% Match*3rd Quantile   0.083 
   (0.054) 
  25% Match*4th Quantile   0.043 
   (0.054) 
  25% Match*5th Quantile   0.104* 
   (0.053) 
  50% Match*2nd Quantile   0.000 
   (0.000) 
  50% Match*3rd Quantile   -0.001 
   (0.052) 
  50% Match*4th Quantile   0.003 
   (0.052) 
  50% Match*5th Quantile   -0.059 
   (0.053) 
Constant 0.213*** 0.051 0.068 
 (0.012) (0.049) (0.053) 
Demographic/Financial Controls No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.269 0.306 0.308 
Observations 3,979 3,979 3,979 
Note: *p < .05; ***p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients represent the change in the probability of 
deferring 20% of one's refund compared to the reference group for that independent variable based on linear 
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probability models. Models 2 and 3 control for refund quantiles and covariates including income, filing status, 
number of dependents, race/ethnicity, gender, home, credit card, and bank account ownership, taxes withheld, 
budgeting habits, ability to come up with $2,000 in an emergency, material hardship and financial shocks in the 
prior six months, and health insurance status. 
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Figure 2  
Predicted Probabilities of Refund Deferrals by Match Condition and Refund Quantile 
 
Note: These predicted probabilities are derived from the regression estimate in Model 3 in Table 6. This model 
includes an array of demographic and financial controls, as well as an interaction between refund match rates and 
refund quantile. N=3,979. 
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